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ABSTRACT 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) amongst its goals included 
both non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The cases Marshall 
Islands v. United Kingdom, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India show that 
nuclear disarmament remains an unresolved issue. These cases refer to Article VI of NPT as 
being breached, and allege that the NPT can be considered to be customary international law. 
Furthermore, nuclear non-proliferation obligation has been fulfilled, however the obligation 
of nuclear disarmament has not been fulfilled. The Marshall Islands cases present three 
significant flaws in the NPT. The first flaw which is the ambiguous wording of Article VI of 
the Treaty has allowed nuclear weapon states to ignore their obligation of nuclear 
disarmament. The second flaw which is the inequality between the signatories of the Treaty 
has aided nuclear weapon states in retaining their nuclear weapons. The third flaw of 
jurisdictive unclarity has resulted in the Treaty being difficult to enforce. 
Keywords: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of 
Justice, inequality between signatories of a treaty, flawed treaty. 
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SUMMARY 
This research paper explores the question of how flawed is the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The applications of Marshall Islands to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) were used to select the flaws for further discussion. Three 
cases of those Marshall Islands brought to the Court were used for this purpose. Those cases 
were Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. 
India. From the flaws presented by these cases three were chosen. The first flaw chosen was 
the unequal sacrifices given by the signatories of the NPT, as the cases showed that non 
nuclear weapon states had fulfilled their obligations, but the nuclear weapon states had not 
fulfilled their obligations. The second flaw chosen was the ambiguous wording of Article VI 
of the NPT which prescribed the breached obligations to the nuclear weapon states. The third 
flaw chosen was the jurisdictive unclarity of the NPT, as the cases showed that currently it is 
unknown whether the NPT can be considered to be customary international law (CIL). 
The first chapter of this research paper provides the background of the creation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, in order for the reader to have the required contextual information for the 
following section. It also provides further details on the cases Marshall Islands v. United 
Kingdom, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India. The contextual 
background reasons for why Marshall Islands submitted the applications is given, the 
allegations against the defendants are explained, the judgement by the Court is elaborated 
upon. This chapter also shortly describes the other six applications the Marshall Islands 
submitted to the International Court of Justice due to the other defendants also being nuclear 
weapon states, and explains why these cases were immediately dismissed. This chapter 
provides the necessary background information and contains the information which led to the 
three specific flaws being chosen. 
The second chapter of this research paper analyses further the flaws selected in the first 
chapter. The first flaw analysed is the inequality between the signatories of the NPT. The 
chosen term for this issue is the principle of equality. This issue is analysed using the 1966 
General Assembly statements of the defendants- United Kingdom, Pakistan, India. These 
statements show that states already in 1966 during the negotiations were worried about 
whether all obligations would be fulfilled equally. These statements also further the 
understanding of what the principle of equality means. The second flaw analysed in this 
chapter is the ambiguous wording of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The text of 
the article analysed and the 1996 advisory opinion by the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons. This advisory opinion provided a clarification on the meaning of 
Article VI of the NPT. The third flaw analysed is the uncertainty in jurisdictive issues 
regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Marshall Islands applications alleged that Article 
VI of the NPT should be considered customary international law. This idea is developed 
further by exploring the concept of customary international law and how it can be ascertained 
whether a treaty should be considered CIL or not. The question of whether Article VI of the 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty should be considered customary international law is answered by the 
author by applying the methods previously explored.  
The third chapter of this research paper analyses how these three flaws have impacted the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The principle of equality of sacrifice 
was not obeyed, and while non nuclear weapon states fulfilled their obligations, the nuclear 
weapon states did not. This has resulted in nuclear disarmament not having been achieved, 
nor any significant progress has been made towards it. The second flaw of the ambiguous 
wording of the Article VI of the NPT resulted in more than two decades passing before the 
ICJ provided the correct interpretation for the article. This in turn resulted in a long stretch of 
time in which the nuclear weapon states were free to not fulfill their obligations. The unclarity 
in jurisdictive issues regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty have resulted in the Treaty being 
very difficult to enforce. These three flaws together have resulted in a treaty which has been 
only partially successful, hard to enforce and one which is unequal in regards to the 
obligations prescribed to the nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has not successfully 
fulfilled most of its goals. New nuclear weapon wielding states have emerged after the 
ratification of the Treaty, disarmament is a distant dream. The arms race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was stopped, but since then little progress has been made in 
fulfilling the Treaty’s goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  
The cases of Marshall Islands v. India, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, and Marshall Islands v. 
The United Kingdom refer to several weaknesses in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Vague 
wording of Article VI of the NPT, jurisdictive issues regarding the NPT, the unequality of the 
NPT on a practical level are the key issues which will be analysed in this research paper, 
which have been either referred to in the aforementioned cases, or explored during the 
negotiation process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
The hypothesis put forth by the author is that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is flawed, 
especially in regards to Article VI, jurisdictive unclarity and inequality between the 
signatories of the Treaty. The research question which will be answered by this research paper 
is as follows: to what extent has the ambiguous wording of Article VI, jurisdictive unclarity 
and inequality between the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as shown by the 
Marshall Islands cases resulted in a flawed Treaty? 
This research will be divided in three distinct parts. Chapter I will contain the needed context 
regarding the Treaty and the cases. More specifically the procedural history of the Treaty will 
be laid out in order to understand the circumstances of its creation. After that two separate 
sections will take a look at the cases of Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. 
India, Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, and the final section of Chapter I will explore the 
rejected cases which Marshall Islands brought against the other nuclear weapon states. The 
second chapter will analyze the flaws and issues in the Treaty which either were referred to in 
the previously mentioned cases or which can be inferred from the cases. Three issues will be 
explored in detail- the principle of equality of sacrifice, the issues regarding Article VI of the 
Treaty as well as the unclarity of the customary international law status of the Treaty and 
Article VI of the Treaty. The third chapter of this research paper will attempt to draw further 
conclusions from the analysed flaws, in order to answer the research question and either prove 
or disprove the hypothesis put forth by the author.  
This research paper will rely on the aforementioned cases of Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, 
Marshall Islands v. India, Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, as well as other relevant 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) documents such as the advisory opinion regarding the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the text of the Treaty itself as well as copious 
amounts of United Nations (UN) verbatim records, resolutions, etc, and most importantly 
research done by experts in their fields. 
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1. CHAPTER I THE TREATY AND THE CASES  
1.1 Procedural History of the Treaty 
The United Nations being a body which consists of a multitude of states, rather than a 
homogeneous entity, relies on states to bring forth acute issues. At the same time, committees 
are tasked with providing a factual explanation of said issues, and with suggesting possible 
solutions. The Treaty came into force following this usual procedure.  
The Disarmament Commission, the successor of the Atomic Energy Commission and the 
Commission for Conventional Armaments was established on 11th January 1952 with goals 
including, but not being limited to, the elimination of mass destruction weapons, prohibition 
of nuclear weapons.
1
 However, the Disarmament Commission truly came in action at a later 
date, discussed further in the text.  
On 17th October 1958, at the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly Ireland introduced 
a draft resolution suggesting that the feasibility of an international agreement regarding the 
non-proliferation, non dissemination of nuclear weapons and cessation of nuclear weapon 
testing should be explored further
2
. This was the first inkling of the Treaty which was still to 
come. In the following, 14th, General Assembly session, the aforementioned resolution 1380 
(XIV) was adopted and the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was tasked with 
analysing the feasibility of a voluntary international agreement regarding the previously 
mentioned issues
3
.  
The Ten Nation Committee did not consider the issue of nuclear weapon non-proliferation, 
and as such the General Assembly in the following 15th
4
 and 16th
5
 sessions reiterated the 
importance of nuclear weapon non-proliferation and in 16th session also tasked the General-
Secretary to inquire what would be the necessary stipulations for an international agreement 
                                                 
1
 United Nations. Resolution 502 Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all 
armaments ; international control of atomic energy. Official records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session. 
Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee. 11 January 1952  Available on: 
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/502(VI). Accessed March 1, 2020. 
2
 United Nations. Official records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, 953
rd
 meeting of the First 
Committee, 17 October 1958. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-
accelerate.amazonaws.com/documents/library/A-C1-SR953.pdf. Accessed March 1, 2020. 
3
 United Nations. Resolution 1380 Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Official records of 
the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session. 21 November 1959. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1380(xiv). Accessed March 1, 2020. 
4
 United Nations.  Resolution 1576 Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Official records 
of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, 20 
December 1960. Available on: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1576(xv). Accessed 
March 1, 2020. 
5
 United Nations.  Resolution 1665 Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Official records 
of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, 4 
December 1961. Available on: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1665(xvi). Accessed 
March 1, 2020. 
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on the non dissemination of nuclear weapons to be introduced
6
. The finding of common 
ground between several member states, especially the USSR and the United States at the time 
was a tall order to fulfill, even as it was a necessity to progress further with the idea of nuclear 
non-proliferation.  
The results of the inquiry were submitted to the Disarmament Committee on 2nd April 1962. 
After this, the motion towards a treaty prohibiting dissemination and proliferation of nuclear 
weapons picked up speed. In 1961 the Ten Nation Committee was succeeded by the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee which had the goal of a “general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control”7, while general and complete disarmament did not 
necessarily refer to only nuclear weapons, they were a critically important issue of the time 
period and received a large amount of attention. Less than a year later, in 1962, both the US 
and the USSR had submitted their versions of a draft treaty regarding general and complete 
disarmament.
8
  
The draft treaty by the USSR was submitted on 15th March 1962, by the US on 18th of April 
1962. Half a year later and the Cuban Missile Crisis took place, regarded by most as the time 
when the world came closest to an all out nuclear war. Progress, however small, became of 
crucial importance. And so, for a while progress towards a comprehensive nuclear arms treaty 
was stalled, while other, smaller treaties, became the focal point. Year 1963 saw the Treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (usually 
referred to as Partial Test Ban Treaty) come into force, which was a small step, but one 
needed for a world which had come so close to nuclear destruction.  
At the same time, the space race between the USSR and the United States was heating up. 
United Nations General Assembly’s Eighteenth Sessions resolutions9 show a high level of 
concern about the possibility that carriers of nuclear missiles would be launched in space, as 
well as concern regarding nuclear tests in space. However, as the aforementioned document 
shows, neither the USSR nor the United States were interested in pursuing the placement of 
nuclear weapons in space.  
In 1965 a new wave of urgency overtook the United Nations. The success of the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty showed that progress was possible, and it became time to once again turn towards 
a nuclear arms treaty. The nuclear weapon issue was highlighted in the work of both the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, and the United Nations Disarmament Committee 
                                                 
6
 United Nations.  Resolution 1664 Question of disarmament. Official records of the General Assembly, 
Sixteenth Session, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, 4 December 1961. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1664(xvi). Accessed March 1, 2020. 
7
 United Nations.  Resolution 1722 Question of disarmament. Official records of the General Assembly, 
Sixteenth Session, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, 20 December 1961. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1722(xvi). Accessed March 1, 2020. 
8
 United Nations. Introductory note to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Available on: 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html. Accessed March 2, 2020. 
9
 United Nations.  Resolution 1908 Question of general and complete disarmament. Official records of the 
General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, 27 November 
1963. Available on: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/1908(XVIII). Accessed March 2, 
2020. 
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once again. In 1965 draft treaties and motions regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
were submitted by the US, Italy, the eight states which joined the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee when it succeeded the Ten Nation Committee (them being Brazil, 
Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic), and the 
USSR.
10
  
In 1967 the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee held a conference in Geneva regarding 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and working towards a definite version of a treaty, a 
year later in 1968 the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States took place in Geneva with 
the same goal.
11
 After the Non-Nuclear-Weapon State conference further improvements were 
made to the draft treaties submitted by the US and the USSR in 1967. In 1968 on 11th of 
March the USSR and the US submitted a joint draft treaty, although it must be pointed out 
that all treaties previously separately submitted by the USSR and the US regarding nuclear 
weapon non-proliferation were either the same in spirit, or completely identical.   
After the consideration of the draft treaty by the First Commission and revision, it was 
adopted as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To summarise the 
results, the Treaty obliged the nuclear power states to never transfer nuclear weapons to 
another state, and for non nuclear weapon states to never receive nuclear weapons. Non 
nuclear weapon states agreed to accept safeguard for ensuring that their obligations are being 
fulfilled. The Treaty specifically allowed all peaceful nuclear power technology to be shared 
and obliged all states to facilitate this process.  
1.2 Marshall Islands v. India, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, 
Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom 
Marshall Islands submitted cases to the International Court of Justice against all 
nuclear power states, however only three of them were accepted by the Court. These three 
cases were Marshall Islands v. India, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. 
United Kingdom. This section will focus solely on these three cases with the reasons for 
dismissing the other cases explained in the following section.  
The timing of the submission of the cases was chosen purposefully. The cases were submitted 
on the 24th of April 2014, just after the 2014 February Conference on the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons
12
, and only four days before the 2014 Preparatory Committee for 
the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
13
, where the minister of 
foreign affairs delivered a scathing reminder to the present parties of the dangers of nuclear 
                                                 
10
 United Nation. Supra note 8. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of 
Nuclear Weapons. Available on: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-
mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/. 
Accessed March 3, 2020. 
13
 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2014 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt2015/prepcom2014/. Accessed March 3, 2020. 
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weapons
14
. Furthermore, Marshall Islands were, and remain, uniquely suited for bringing any 
breaches of the NPT to the ICJ, as due to being a nation which has suffered much from 
nuclear testing they are a singularly invested party.  
Marshall Islands became an independent state only in 1986, when the United States officially 
signed the Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
United States in law
15
, as since 1944 the United States had held the Marshall Islands. During 
the years that the United States held the Marshall Islands in trusteeship it was used as grounds 
for extensive nuclear weapon testing. After the end of World War II the United States began 
their nuclear weapon tests, and from 1946 until 1958 the United States had performed 67 
nuclear weapon tests
16
, which left the islands with an incredibly high level of radiological 
contamination.
17
 The 1954 test Bravo was deemed “the worst radiological disaster in US 
history”18, understandable as it was “1,000 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima 
atomic bomb”19. The Atomic Heritage Foundation lists the known long term effects and 
issues faced by the people of the Marshall Islands as “forced relocation, burns, birth defects, 
and cancers.”20. To sum up, the nuclear weapon issue has created a multitude of issues to the 
Marshall Islands, and the Marshall Islands are determined to bring back the topic of nuclear 
disarmament to the minds of the international community. This is evident from both the 
history of Marshall Islands, them submitting cases against all nuclear weapon states 
(including Israel, which has not admitted to having nuclear weapons), and as well from the 
specifically chosen date for the submission of the applications to the ICJ. 
From the three cases which proceeded to the ICJ, only one was against a state party to the 
NPT. As such, the case against the United Kingdom will be analysed separately from the 
cases against Pakistan and India.  
  
                                                 
14
 Tony de Brum. Statement at the General Debate of the third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 
2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Delivered at United Nations, New York, 28 April 
2014. Available on: https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/2927404/marshall-islands.pdf.. 
15
 Legal Information System of the Federated States of Micronesia. Compact of Free Association. Available on: 
http://www.fsmlaw.org/compact/. Accessed March 3, 2020. 
16
 Calin Georgescu. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations related to 
environmentally 
sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste. United Nations Human Rights Council, 
Twenty-first session. Available on: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/149/26/PDF/G1214926.pdf?OpenElement.  
17
 Robert C. Whitcomb, JR.  Reconstruction and analysis of cesium- 137 fallout deposition in the Marshall 
Islands (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2000). Available on:  
https://ia802305.us.archive.org/28/items/reconstructionan00whit/reconstructionan00whit.pdf.  
18
 Radiochemistry Society. Operation castle 1954 – Pacific Proving Ground. U.S. Nuclear tests info gallery. 
Available on: http://www.radiochemistry.org/history/nuke_tests/castle/index.html. Accessed March 3, 2020. 
19
 Robert Alvarez. The Marshall Islands and the NPT. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Available on: 
https://thebulletin.org/2015/05/the-marshall-islands-and-the-npt/. Accessed March 3, 2020. 
20
 Atomic Heritage Foundation. Marshall Islands. Available on: 
https://www.atomicheritage.org/location/marshall-islands. Accessed March 3, 2020. 
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1.2.1 Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom 
The Marshall Islands in their application against the United Kingdom accused it of 
breaching international law on three points, them being firstly the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith so as to stop the nuclear arms race as per Article VI of the NPT, secondly the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith so as to achieve nuclear disarmament as per Article VI of 
the NPT, and thirdly the obligation to perform its legal duties in good faith by itself, as well as 
customary international law which encompasses all previously mentioned obligations.
21
  
Regarding the accusation against the United Kingdom of their not negotiating in good faith so 
as to stop the nuclear arms race, the Marshall Islands submitted an account of the numerous 
modernisation efforts which the United Kingdom had taken in the years following their 
ratification of the NPT.
22
  
Regarding the nuclear disarmament issue, the modernisation of the United Kingdom’s nuclear 
arsenal is by itself against the disarmament principle, however in this case the applicant 
provided several examples of occasions where the United Kingdom explicitly refused to enter 
negotiations regarding nuclear disarmament.
23
  
The accusation that the United Kingdom had breached their obligation to perform legal duties 
in good faith largely required the same evidence as the previous two accusations, since Article 
VI of NPT which impressed the previous two obligations explicitly names an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith. Furthermore, not only was this explicitly named obligation breached, 
but the very fact itself that Article VI was breached on the aforementioned two fronts signifies 
that the United Kingdom had not performed their obligations in good faith. The final 
accusation of breaching customary international law will be discussed further in the following 
sections.  
However, the ICJ after the examination of whether it is able to judge this case discovered that 
the provided evidence by the Marshall Islands is not sufficient to deem that a dispute between 
the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom exists.
24
 The judgement was based mainly on 
the fact that there had been no bilateral conversation between the Marshall Islands and the 
United Kingdom, nor had Marshall Islands directly informed the United Kingdom of the 
dispute. The Marshall Islands evidence of the existence of a dispute was mainly declarations 
on the international stage calling for progress in nuclear disarmament, the very application to 
the ICJ being an act of informing the other party, and voting records of the parties regarding 
                                                 
21
 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. Filed in the 
Registry of the Court on 24 April 2014, paras. 15-17. Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/160/160-20140424-APP-01-00-EN.pdf.  
22
 Ibid. pp. 16-36. 
23
 Ibid. pp. 36-46. 
24
 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 
833., paras. 26-58. Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/160/160-20161005-JUD-01-00-
EN.pdf. 
 12 
nuclear disarmament and connected issues.
25
 All of these arguments were deemed lacking by 
the ICJ and the case was dismissed on the grounds of absence of a dispute.
26
 
 
1.2.2 Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India 
The Marshall Islands applications to the ICJ against India and Pakistan were similar in 
build, if not in content. Both India and Pakistan were not and are not signatories to the NPT, 
and as such Article VI of the NPT couldn’t be considered breached. However, as mentioned 
in the previous section Marshall Islands argued that NPT, and more specifically the 
obligations impressed by Article VI of the NPT (to negotiate in good faith towards nuclear 
disarmament and to negotiate in good faith towards a stop to the nuclear arms race) should be 
considered as customary international law.
2728
 Furthermore, the Marshall Islands accused 
Pakistan and India of failing their obligation to perform their legal obligations in good 
faith.
2930
 
Given the similar nature of both the Pakistani case and the Indian case, the build of the 
applications against them is almost identical. Accusations against India and Pakistan 
regarding them not performing their obligation to negotiate in good faith towards stopping the 
nuclear arms race were proved by the same approach as that to the United Kingdom case. 
Namely, regarding Pakistan, the state has allegedly not stopped increasing their nuclear 
weapon stockpile, as well as has continuously improved their weapon production capabilities 
and the nuclear weapon capabilities themselves, and blocked negotiations on a subject matter 
directly related to the nuclear weapon arms race.
31
 In the application against India, the 
allegations are more of the same, the breach of CIL can be seen in that India has continued 
improving their nuclear weapon capabilities, as well as has been increasing their stockpile of 
weapon-grade plutonium.
32
 
Regarding nuclear disarmament, India has supported the commencement of nuclear weapon 
disarmament convention negotiations
33
, however, the Marshall Islands argue that as per the 
ICJ advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the obligation 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. paras. 48-69. 
26
 Ibid. paras. 58-59. 
27
 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan), Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. Filed in the Registry of 
the Court on 24 April 2014, pp. 26-30 and pp. 35-36. Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/159/159-20140424-APP-01-00-EN.pdf. 
28
 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J. Filed in the Registry of the 
Court on 24 April 2014, pp. 28-32 and pp. 36-38. Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/158/158-20140424-APP-01-00-EN.pdf. 
29
 Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, supra note 27, pp. 30-34 and pp. 34-36. 
30
 Marshall Islands v. India, supra note 28, pp. 32-36 and pp. 36-38. 
31
 Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, supra note 27, pp. 27-30. 
32
 Marshall Islands v. India, supra note 28, paras 29-34. 
33
 Ibid., paras 35-37. 
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by CIL is to also conclude negotiations, not only begin them, as well as India by improving 
their nuclear capabilities and increasing stockpiles have acted contrary to the goal of nuclear 
disarmament
34
. This will be discussed further in detail at a later point. The application against 
Pakistan as well alleges that while Pakistan has supported calls for a convention on nuclear 
disarmament, the CIL obligation to conclude negotiations on this matter has not been 
fulfilled, and by increasing stockpiles of the necessary components to create nuclear weapons 
as well as improving their nuclear weapon capabilities have acted directly against the goal of 
nuclear disarmament.
35
 
The allegation of Pakistan and India having breached their obligation under CIL to fulfill their 
legal obligations in good faith is evidenced by the factors discussed in the previous two 
paragraphs. Marshall Islands elaborates, that these breaches are counter to the principle of 
good faith by directly hindering the fulfillment of the previously discussed obligations. 
Furthermore, the increase of nuclear weapon stockpiles and nuclear weapon capabilities might 
urge other nuclear powers into doing the same, in that way inducing other states to breach 
their obligations in return as well.
36,37
 
The question of whether NPT can be considered as CIL or not will be discussed in a further 
section. Regardless, due to much of the same reasons as the Marshall Islands application 
against the United Kingdom, these applications were also dismissed on the grounds of no 
dispute existing between the parties.
38,39
 The submitted evidence by the Marshall Islands was 
of the same concept as that in their application against the United Kingdom. Namely, 
declarations on the international sphere, the submission of the application itself and voting 
records as well as noninvolvement in possible negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. 
 
1.2.3 The Marshall Islands v. the Other Nuclear States, Where the Other 
Cases Ended Up 
The Marshall Islands experience with the United States is undoubtedly worse than the 
experiences it has had with the United Kingdom, Pakistan or India due to the nuclear tests that 
were done on the Marshall Islands soil by the United States. However, the Marshall Islands 
did not bring a single case before the ICJ against the United States, or even four cases if the 
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previously mentioned cases against the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India are counted as 
well. The Marshall Islands in one fell swoop attempted to bring cases against all nuclear 
weapon holding states to the ICJ, all similarly accused of breaching Article VI of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Given that Article VI imposes duty to negotiate on nuclear disarmament, 
and as ICJ ruled, to also reach a conclusion in the negotiations, all nuclear weapon holding 
states have indeed breached this article in the most basic sense. However as time limits have 
not been set in the Treaty, nor a specific course of action, so the cases remain highly complex, 
especially as the ICJ advisory opinions are non binding, even if they carry a great weight in 
the international community.
40
 
Regardless, the Marshall Islands attempted to bring the cases against all of the nuclear 
weapon holding states to the ICJ, as mentioned previously. However, this research focuses on 
the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India cases because none of the other attempted cases 
ended up being judged by the ICJ, nor even reached the Court. 
 Regarding the application Marshall Islands attempted to bring to the ICJ against the United 
states, they were unsuccessful as in 1985 the United States withdrew from the International 
Court of Justice’s jurisdiction414243, and the United States did not accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ in this case either. The Marshall Islands were able to bring their case before the courts of 
the United States, however their case was in the end dismissed in 2017
44
, due to the court not 
recognising the Non-Proliferation Treaty as being the jurisdiction of a domestic court. Of 
course, the end result was that the Marshall Islands were unable to pursue their grievance of 
the United States breach of Article VI of the NPT any further. In conclusion, the case of 
Marshall Islands v. the United States could not be pursued at any level, with none of the 
courts to which the Marshall Islands attempted to bring their case to recognising their 
jurisdiction over the Treaty matters. It is a clear difference from the incredible urgency which 
the United States felt when the Treaty negotiation process had just ended, recalling the words 
of the President of the United States of America at the General Assembly Planetary Session 
where Lyndon B. Johnson professed that  
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we shall, as a major nuclear-weapon Power, promptly and vigorously pursue 
negotiations on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce existing 
nuclear arsenals.
45
 
 
The applications to the ICJ against the other nuclear power states- China, France, Israel, 
North Korea, Russia were also not successful. None of these states has recognized the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and, as the Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court stipulates; 
When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a 
consent thereto yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such 
application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not 
however be entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings, 
unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the 
Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.46 
Unsurprisingly the accused parties did not consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction regarding this 
matter and so the Marshall Islands cases were rejected.
47
 Israel of course has never formally 
admitted to having nuclear weapons, although it is considered to be an open secret by now.
48
  
The rejection of 6 out of 9 cases which the Marshall Islands attempted to bring before the ICJ, 
often called World Court, showcases the problems with enforcing the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which will be discussed further in the following sections.  
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2. CHAPTER II THE THREE FLAWS OF THE TREATY 
2.1 The Principle of Equality of Sacrifice in the NPT 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970, at a time when the dangers of 
nuclear weapons were fresh on everybody's minds. The main aims of the Treaty, of those  
to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament
49
 
took around 20 years to be put on paper in a form which the United Nations member states 
were willing to agree upon.  
And still, the Treaty has at times been deemed unequal,
50
 with the non nuclear weapon 
holding states giving up their rights to security measures and the nuclear weapon holding 
states undertaking the obligation to negotiate. After the 1940's and 1950’s the need for 
international peace was pressing, and partially that can explain why the non nuclear weapon 
holding states were ready to adhere to clearly outlined restrictions in order to receive vague 
reassurances.
51
 However, the dismissal of the Marshall Island submitted applications seems to 
imply that the nuclear disarmament clause is currently unenforceable in court, which raises 
the question of inequality in the Treaty. Largely the non-proliferation clause has been adhered 
to by the signatory states and the nuclear disarmament negotiations haven’t progressed. 
At the same time as deeming the Treaty unequal in the weight of obligation, signatory states 
have stressed that the Treaty contains an implied obligation to protect the non nuclear weapon 
holding states and further steps should be taken to assure the non weapon holding states of 
this, especially clearly expressing this in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
52
 This again returns the 
discussion to the principle of equality of sacrifice.   
Further on, the Treaty does not contain a hierarchical order of its aims merely a temporal one, 
which is to say that non-proliferation cannot be considered to be a more important part of the 
Treaty than the nuclear disarmament part. As the case of the “Joint Declaration on the 
question of Hong Kong”53 showcases, the name of a treaty can even contain a misnomer and 
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that still cannot change the fact that in the eye of the law it is considered a treaty. Which is to 
say, despite the title of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons referring only 
to non-proliferation, that does not expressly mean that non-proliferation can be considered as 
the main goal.  
However, despite the letter of the law not containing a hierarchical order of aims, in reality 
the United Nations documentation on the negotiation process and debates regarding the 
Treaty shows that a large number of states considered non-proliferation to be the key goal, 
with only some acknowledging the inequality of the Treaty arising from the comparatively 
vague obligations of nuclear states towards nuclear disarmament. At this moment, a brief 
reference must be made to the VCLT provided supplementary means of interpretation. While 
the following section on the interpretation of Article VI elaborates on why Article VI should 
be interpreted by using the VCLT provided supplementary means in addition to the text of the 
Treaty, the hierarchical order of the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
should not necessitate the use of supplementary interpretative means resulting in a difference 
of the importance of the two goals. The NPT consistently refers to non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament (as well as the other goals) with the same weight and importance, in the 
preamble as well as the body of the Treaty.
54
 
 Returning to the issue of the principle of equality of sacrifice, as well as the unequal nature of 
the treaty, The United Nations General Assembly Twenty-First Sessions official records of 
the general debate will be used as explanatory material. Specifically the declarations of the 
parties to the aforementioned cases of Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, Marshall Islands 
v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India, will be analysed. At the time Marshall Islands 
themselves were under the trusteeship of the United States and as such did not participate. 
The declarations of these parties to the case all discuss the principle of equality of sacrifice, 
and by that the inequality of the Treaty.  
 
2.1.1 The United Kingdom v. the Principle of Equality of Sacrifice 
This particularly revealing debate contains expressions of several major powers of the 
time, some of which as mentioned were a part of the Marshall Islands cases. Lord Chalfont of 
the United Kingdom expressed the view that non-proliferation had to come first before 
nuclear disarmament, as well as urged the other nuclear powers to consider, as he referred to 
it, “equality of sacrifice”55. Equality of sacrifice refers to the previously introduced concept of 
the unequal treaty, namely that as non-nuclear states give up their right to security, the 
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nuclear-power states must sacrifice something
56
 of equal importance. The United Kingdom, 
being a nuclear power state, disagreed with this principle, outlining that non-proliferation was 
in the interests of both nuclear power and non nuclear power states. Nuclear weapons were “a 
ruinously expensive enterprise”57, which shouldn’t be considered by anyone of sound mind as 
an option, as by one new nuclear state emerging it would cause numerous other nuclear states 
to emerge, exponentially increasing the risks associated with holding nuclear weapons. As 
such, the United Kingdom pointed out that the sacrifice of non nuclear states was little more 
than a thought experiment, as regardless of non-proliferation being binding by way of a 
Treaty, it would still have to be adhered to for the security and order of the world.  
Regarding nuclear non-proliferation being the priority over any nuclear disarmament, the 
United Kingdom largely referred to the temporal order of these two issues. Put frankly, the 
debates regarding these two issues had been ongoing for years already. In order to progress on 
a Treaty regarding nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom elaborated, non-proliferation had to 
be considered as the first step. A joint nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, 
which would put nuclear disarmament in strong terms, with deadlines, penalties and so forth, 
would take too long to be created, and the nuclear weapon issue was a pressing one.  
The author must elaborate that these expressions of the United Kingdom showcased the 
nuclear weapon treaty issue quite well. A solution, a treaty, had to be created sooner rather 
than later, and a treaty which put nuclear non-proliferation as the first step and left room to 
argue the issue of nuclear disarmament at least would achieve nuclear non-proliferation if not 
solve the nuclear issue as a whole. However, in the years following the creation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the original goal of the Treaty, a world safe from nuclear weapons, was 
not achieved, nor realistically saw any progress. As much as nuclear disarmament is a 
logistically complicated issue, it should not have been neglected for such a long time, as the 
Marshall Islands argued in their applications to the ICJ. To sum up, the United Kingdom did 
not consider the principle of equal sacrifice to be sound, and as such rejected the possibility of 
the Treaty being an unequal treaty. At the same time, it is important to note that the main goal 
of any state is survival and most often also the safeguarding of their interests. At the time of 
the negotiations, as United Kingdom put it: 
what effect would it have on the policy and attitude of their Governments with regard 
to non-proliferation if the United Kingdom were to announce the next day that it 
would abandon its nuclear capability and destroy its nuclear weapons?
58
. 
This question can be interpreted differently by each of the states present at the debates, which 
can be safely assumed to have been the intent of the United Kingdom. On the one hand the 
United Kingdom could be referring to the deterrence capabilities of nuclear weapons. On the 
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other hand, those states which considered nuclear non-proliferation to be the main priority 
could take a nuclear power state giving up their nuclear weapons as a favourable sign that no 
nuclear disarmament clause was truly necessary. Both of these possibilities would have 
hindered the negotiation process. At the same time this question could have also been used as 
a way to urge the present states to doubt their own intentions and cast their attention away 
from the intentions of the United Kingdom. Regardless of the United Kingdom at the time 
declaring that  
To those who might ask why, in that case, the United Kingdom did not give up its 
nuclear weapons, he would reply that his Government was prepared to do so within 
the framework of an agreed disarmament process in which other countries possessing 
those weapons took part.
59
 
the reality shows that despite the United Kingdom proclaiming their readiness to disarm 
themselves and the obligation of the Article VI of the NPT to negotiate towards this end, 
these proclamations nor obligations have been fulfilled.  
 
2.1.2 Pakistan and Elaborations on the Principle of Sacrifice 
Pakistan, by way of Amjad Ali, also expressed their views regarding nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
60
 At the time of this debate in 1966, Pakistan did 
not have nuclear weapons. Their approach differed from that of the United Kingdom in that 
Pakistan was concerned with issues which would be caused by a non-proliferation treaty 
without a nuclear disarmament clause, while at the same time proclaiming nuclear non-
proliferation to be the highest priority of all nuclear disarmament questions
61
.  
On the issue of non-proliferation Pakistan expressed itself most strongly, that without solving 
the nuclear non-proliferation issue an arms race would be unavoidable and that would in 
return cripple the economies of most states.
62
 The large amount of resources nuclear weapon 
programs demand was an issue also brought up by the United Kingdom. It is important to 
keep in mind that the MAD relationship between the United States and the USSR could be a 
tempting option to states which did not have enough conventional military strength to be able 
to claim deterrence by those means. The remainders uttered by both the United Kingdom and 
Pakistan served as reminders to those states in attendance which were interested in acquiring 
nuclear weapons that the price of them were most likely more than those states would be able 
to afford. 
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Further regarding the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation in works, several issues and possible 
outcomes were analysed. The first issue which Pakistan brought up was the interpretation of 
the term “nuclear proliferation”, especially in regards to military alliances. On one hand there 
was the possibility that military alliances (collective nuclear defence arrangements) wouldn’t 
lead to nuclear proliferation, on the other hand there was also the possibility that these 
alliances would become fronts for new states to acquire nuclear weapons.
63
 The interpretation 
of the terms of the treaty being negotiated on was the key issue.
64
 Without a joint 
interpretation which would be accepted by all parties, the negotiations would stall, or the 
treaty would become unenforceable.  
Onwards Pakistan turned to the issue of nuclear disarmament. Here Pakistan echoed the 
concerns of the United Kingdom in that by introducing strict requirements of nuclear 
disarmament to the treaty on non-proliferation the progress would stall. Even with most if not 
all states agreeing on a non-proliferation treaty being necessary, the negotiations progressed at 
a pace slower than that preferred. At the same time, a declaration of intent to embark on 
nuclear disarmament, or other reassurances were necessary, as with solely non-proliferation 
being the core issue of the treaty new difficulties would arise. 
65
 
One possibility was that if non-proliferation was enforced and yet nuclear states did not 
disarm themselves, then it was probable that power would become concentrated in the hands 
of those with nuclear weapons. A legal document allowing for specific states to hold such 
power over other states would not be accepted by the international community. Another 
option would be that nuclear states would simply not move towards nuclear disarmament, 
especially having received the assurance that no new states would become nuclear weapon 
holders.
6667
  
This in turn led to the everpresent principle of equality of sacrifice, to which Pakistan added 
another discussable issue. While equality of sacrifice could be discussed, at the basis of the 
concept was the idea that the sacrifice was going to be honored. Non nuclear weapon states 
not acquiring nuclear weapons and in return the nuclear powers disarming themselves of 
nuclear weapons. One without the other would be a betrayal of the principle, keeping in mind 
that logistics required non-proliferation to be assured first and only then turning to the issue of 
nuclear disarmament. Pakistan questioned whether the option of honoring the sacrifice would 
be enough to force the nuclear power states to fulfill their own obligations of disarmament. 
Pakistan further emphasized that the question should be approached practically and not by 
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replying dogmatically, which due to ethics would insist that the sacrifice should be honored 
and as such will be.
68
  
However, as Pakistan stressed, both the US and the USSR had provided reassurance
69
 that 
non-proliferation was not considered as the stopping point, but “it should be viewed solely as 
a step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons”70.  
 Regardless of the declarations of the two superpowers of the time, it was possible that some 
nuclear states wouldn’t ratify the treaty, which concerned Pakistan as that raised the question 
of how non nuclear state security could be assured.
71
 At the same time, an iron clad treaty was 
not possible at the time, and without concessions by the non nuclear power states the treaty 
wouldn’t progress.72 Nowadays, as mentioned in the sections discussing the Marshall Islands 
cases, Pakistan itself is a nuclear power state which has not ratified the NPT.   
Pakistan provided some additional points on the security of non nuclear states, which while 
weren’t connected to the principle of equality of sacrifice by Pakistan, can be considered 
tangential. For non nuclear state security to be guaranteed, then no first strike protocols 
(meaning that nuclear weapons would only be used in retaliation against nuclear weapons) 
would need to be received from all nuclear states, otherwise they wouldn’t hold weight. Any 
states not willing to adhere to such a protocol would shift the equality of sacrifice in an 
unfavourable direction for the non nuclear power states, as their agreement to non-
proliferation would not be returned with assurances of security or nuclear disarmament. 
Another option would be to court one or more nuclear states for protection in case of a 
nuclear strike from the other states. However, this once again would be an option resulting in 
the accumulation of power in the hands of the nuclear power states.
73
 
Pakistan in their arguments before the General Assembly made clear that there were still 
many obstacles for the negotiations to decide on. On the issues previously discussed there was 
no consensus among the involved parties. However, Pakistan proposed that in order to create 
a treaty which would satisfy all states, small and large, non nuclear and nuclear, the viewpoint 
of the smaller, non nuclear states must be heard. The proposed action was for the non nuclear 
states to hold a conference in order to discuss the aforementioned topics and issues.
74
 
The principle of the equality of sacrifice was weighed against pragmatism in the Pakistani 
declaration. On the one hand, Pakistan admitted that inequality between the nuclear power 
states and non nuclear power states was concerning. Primarily from the security aspect, as the 
danger of any nuclear power states which wouldn’t ratify the treaty remained. However also 
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from the possibility that nuclear disarmament would be a provision ignored once the non-
proliferation clause was fulfilled and continued to be so. On the other hand, outright rejecting 
the treaty or not accepting compromises would make the treaty impossible to conclude. In the 
end, Pakistan balanced the two needs by proposing that a stronger voice could be given to the 
non nuclear power states, while keeping in mind that the cooperation of the nuclear states was 
a necessity.  
 
2.1.3 India and a Balanced Treaty 
At the time of the debate in 1966 India was not yet a nuclear power state. India by way 
of Mr. Trivedi had yet another approach to the treaty in negotiations, as the question of 
nuclear weapon proliferation was considered from the linguistic and grammatical perspective. 
Nuclear weapon non-proliferation was to be considered as firstly proliferation in the sense of 
dissemination, as in one state transferring nuclear weapons or their plans to another state. 
Additionally, proliferation was to be considered in the conventional sense, as in a rapid 
growth in the number of something. For nuclear weapons it would mean an increase in the 
nuclear weapon stockpiles would fall under this definition.
75
 From the discussed states, India 
is the only one connecting proliferation to increases in stockpiles. 
Further on India elaborated, that new states acquiring nuclear weapons or starting nuclear 
programs lead to instability in the relevant regions. However, the continuing arms race and 
growing stockpiles of the existing nuclear powers was the real danger, as for years those 
nuclear powers had already been capable of destroying the world as we know it. The reasons 
for the arms race were those of security and also prestige.
76
 While nuclear weapon deterring 
capabilities couldn’t be denied, the arms race of increasingly sophisticated weapons and sheer 
amount of weapons was one of prestige, rather than security, since their destructive 
capabilities were already sufficient for destroying the world. The key end goal was a world 
free from the destructive nuclear weapons, and nuclear non-proliferation, in all meaning of 
the word, was only the first step towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.  
The idea of nuclear weapon states no longer increasing the amount of weapons they hold and 
in return non nuclear weapon states undertaking to not receive nuclear weapons was referred 
to as balance or mutual obligations and responsibilities.
77
 However, the core idea was the 
same as that of the principle of equality of sacrifice, which was discussed by both the United 
Kingdom and Pakistan.  
The difference lies in the shift of responsibility for nuclear weapon states, from a promise of 
disarmament to a clause of non-proliferation of their own. However, India does acknowledge 
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the necessity to conclude a non-proliferation treaty first, and only then turn towards complete 
nuclear disarmament. At the same time, India’s version of non-proliferation would bring 
closer the gap between the treaty in works at the time, and the possible future treaty on 
nuclear disarmament. With non-proliferation having an additional meaning, the interpretation 
proposed by India would introduce stricter bounds for nuclear weapon states and bring closer 
nuclear disarmament by way of weapon stockpile stall. There remains a possibility that if 
India’s proposition would have been added to the NPT it wouldn’t have been fulfilled. 
However, an introduction of more concrete and less vague articles would have lessened the 
chance of incorrect interpretations.  
In the context of nuclear weapon non-proliferation, the question of control over nuclear 
weapons versus owning nuclear weapons is a clear issue to India. This question was also 
brought up by Pakistan, when it debated the issue of military alliances and nuclear weapon 
proliferation. By the assessment of India, non-proliferation is applicable to both owning and 
controlling. At the same time, a distinction of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology must 
be made. For the less developed states to progress technology is of key importance, and 
despite concerns of nuclear weapon proliferation, peaceful non weaponized nuclear 
technology cannot remain solely in the arms of current nuclear states.
78
 
From the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India, it was India which spent the most time 
discussing issues pertaining to developing countries and matters regarding the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. Nuclear disarmament was not a goal to be achieved in the future, but one 
towards which steps had to be and could be taken simultaneously with the NPT. 
 
 2.2 Article VI of the Treaty 
The case law of Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, 
Marshall Islands v. India has been previously used in this research and in each of these cases 
Marshall Islands accused the other party of breaching Article VI of the Treaty.  As such, this 
segment of the research paper will elaborate on Article VI and especially the second 
obligation prescribed by it. The further discussed ambiguous wording and unclear purpose 
behind Article VI of the NPT has created differences in the interpretation of the Treaty, as 
seen in the Marshall Island cases. This is one of the more important flaws in the NPT, as this 
has firstly created issues in the enforceability of the Treaty and secondly provided states 
which do not wish to comply an opportunity to do so. The issues in Article VI will be 
discussed further on. 
Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lays out the obligation for 
states to pursue negotiations in good faith with three goals. The first being a cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date, a key issue at the time of the Cold War, with time being 
paramount. The second being  nuclear disarmament, which has not been reached in the 50 
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years since this Treaty entered into force. The final goal of a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament directly echoes the goal of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, as 
discussed beforehand.  
In order to fully understand the implications of Article VI, the 1996 advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons must 
be referred to. The United Nations with the resolution 49/75 K sought the opinion of the ICJ 
on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permitted under international law.
79
 The 
Court considered that the use of nuclear weapons was a continuous danger to the international 
order, and for peace to be kept the goal of Article VI must be upheld, that being nuclear 
disarmament.
80
  
Furthermore, the Court ruled that, 
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; 
the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the 
pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith. 
81
 
which in essence prescribes the signatory parties an obligation to reach the goal of nuclear 
disarmament, not only conduct negotiations regarding it. This ruling provides a key 
alternative in interpretation, as the wording of Article VI can otherwise be interpreted as 
imposing an obligation to negotiate, which in effect weakens the enforceability of this article.  
At the same time, preparatory works which are available to the public states repeatedly refer 
to the dangers of nuclear weapons and a world in which they are readily available. The end 
goal being a world free of nuclear weapons and the dangers they pose is understood by all 
parties involved in the preparatory process.
82,83,84
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
although having come in force 10 years after the NPT came in force, is generally understood 
to be a codification of customary law and as such can be taken as a provisional guide for the 
interpretation of NPT, and Article VI of it. Article 32 of VCLT elaborates on what 
supplementary documents can be used for the further interpretation of a treaty in a case where 
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the text of the treaty “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure”85, and preparatory work of 
the treaty as well as the circumstances of its conclusion are considered to be usable
86
.  
Given that a clarification by the ICJ was necessary, it can provisionally be said that the 
wording of Article VI did indeed leave the meaning of it ambiguous. At this time, the 
advisory opinion of the ICJ can be echoed. The preparatory work of the Treaty showed time 
and time again that the United Nations member states understood the dangers of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapon holding states were generally more concerned with non-
proliferation than nuclear disarmament. But given the MAD nature of the relationship 
between the United States and the USSR, these states were understandably unwilling to give 
up their deterrence powers, especially with the logistical impossibility of a simultaneous 
nuclear disarmament and the lack of feasible reassurance that the other party would indeed 
destroy any and all nuclear weapons. The non nuclear weapon holding states on the other 
hand were understandably just as concerned with nuclear disarmament as they were with non-
proliferation. Not much good would be gained by non nuclear states if they promised to never 
obtain nuclear weapons, while at the same time the nuclear weapon holding states would 
always retain their nuclear weapons and still pose danger to them. This is further elaborated 
upon the sections discussing the principle of equality of sacrifice. 
What all states were able to agree upon was that nuclear weapons were dangerous, the world 
peace and international order was at stake at the time. They were not quite able to agree on 
the importance of nuclear disarmament. The previously provided references to verbatim 
records of planetary sessions show this dual nature quite well. The United States as well as 
the USSR avoid mentioning nuclear disarmament and focus on nuclear non-proliferation, 
while other states quite often refer to nuclear disarmament as a lofty goal but one worth 
pursuing.  
The other provided for aspect for interpretation mentioned beforehand was the circumstances 
of the conclusion of the treaty in question. Even a loose understanding of the state of politics 
at the time of the creation of the Treaty provides an immediate answer for why Article VI was 
so ambiguously worded. The theory of mutual assured destruction emerged in the 1960’s at a 
time when the world balance still hung by a thread. In short, the MAD theory prescribes that 
two or more states holding nuclear weapons would not strive to ever strike first, as due to the 
other state having different delivery systems of nuclear weapons it would still be able to 
retaliate even when struck first. The deterring nature of the nuclear weapons and MAD was 
sorely relied upon by both the United States and the USSR. On one hand, their reliance on the 
deterrence of nuclear weapons was an unique aspect of that time period, and seemingly a 
necessary evil. At the same time, by 1970 it was unavoidably known that nuclear weapons 
had an immense destructive power and posed danger to the entire world.  
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This dual nature of nuclear weapons having a deterring quality and yet being incredibly 
dangerous is still present today as much as it was at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. 
And so, while VCLT allows for the use of preparatory works and circumstances of the time to 
interpret vaguely worded articles, the truth remains that the states weren’t quite in agreement 
on Article VI.  Of the three goals of Article VI- stopping the arms race, nuclear disarmament, 
general and complete disarmament, only one has been achieved. The conclusion of the arms 
race between the United States and the USSR was achieved, and simultaneously it was the 
only goal on which all states could truly agree upon. Nuclear disarmament, as discussed 
beforehand, was questioned by the nuclear power holding states, or at the very least avoided. 
General and complete disarmament is an unimaginable goal even today, one which seems to 
be even more ambitious than just solely nuclear disarmament.  
In conclusion, the ICJ advisory opinion provided an interpretation that not only Article VI 
requires the holding of negotiations, it also requires for states to conclude the negotiations. 
The Treaty itself does not quite provide specific enough wording for Article VI to have only 
one interpretation, and VCLT provided for supplementary interpretation methods also cannot 
reveal a single interpretation. This is one of the failings of the NPT which suggests that at the 
very basis of it, it is an unequal treaty due the ambiguous parts pertaining to the obligations of 
the nuclear weapon states.  
 
2.3 Jurisdiction Over the Treaty, Can it be Considered 
Customary International Law 
To begin any discussion on whether the NPT can be considered customary 
international law, firstly it must be determined what is the status of the NPT currently and at 
the time of the submission of the Marshall Islands cases. After the submission of the Marshall 
Islands applications to the ICJ, the possibility of the NPT being officially welcomed as 
customary international law was widely discussed.
87,88
 However, without a favourable 
judgement by the ICJ, which had dismissed the cases before the question of the NPT being 
customary international law could be discussed, the Treaty for now is not considered to be 
customary international law.  
In order to analyse whether NPT should or could be considered CIL, the next question to be 
answered is what are the methods of determining whether a treaty can be considered to be 
CIL, and what is the accepted definition of CIL. To begin with, customary international law 
signifies that the source of state legal obligations is not written law, but the states themselves 
adhering to these obligations, and these obligations being the customary practice by the states 
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despite not having been put down in written form
89,90
. This is why VCLT is considered to be 
codification of customary international law, that is, CIL which existed before VCLT, and with 
the creation of the VCLT was put in written form. However, as Marshall Islands argued in 
their application, the main concern is not of the NPT as a whole being considered customary 
international law, but whether the obligations prescribed by Article VI of the NPT should be 
considered as CIL. 
For the sake of narrowing the question of how CIL is determined, this section will solely 
consider the methods of ascertaining the existence of CIL as they are used by the ICJ, due to 
this court being the one to which the Marshall Islands cases were submitted to
91
.  
Generally there are two possible approaches to how the customary international law nature of 
a practice can be determined. First approach is inductive, meaning that by analysing the 
actions of states in regards to the principle, and examining whether the actions are in 
accordance with the principle, whether this adherence is consistent, and whether it has 
continued for a sufficient length of time.
92,93
 This would, in simplified terms, mean using 
specific actions by states to formulate a general practice, from specific to general. However, 
in some cases due to logistic reasons the inductive method cannot be used. This could be due 
to the newness of the issue, as was the case in the 1984 judgement on Canada v. United States 
of America according to the ICJ.
94
  
In such a case, it might be possible to apply deductive reasoning, however based in legal 
theory not the conventional meaning of deductive. While inductive reasoning means 
approaching the question from the specific to the general, deductive reasoning uses the 
opposite method. Deductive reasoning can be further divided in additional formats of 
deduction. For the purpose of this research paper, a brief summary is sufficient. Deductive 
approach can take the form of using existing legal norms to formulate narrowed applications 
for them which logistically are a part of the original legal norm.
95
 Secondly, deductive 
reasoning can be applied to persons or organisations, inferring their capabilities not only from 
the official documentation of them, but also by the generally accepted practice.
96
 Finally, 
deductive reasoning can take the shape of law being applied to a case which it originally 
wouldn’t have included, or which the text of it does not specifically recognise.97 
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The final method, one most often used by the ICJ, is assertion, or simply neither applying the 
deductive or inductive method, but stating what the law is, and in this case, which law is to be 
considered customary international law.
98
 With the necessary aspects of customary 
international law, and its identification methods explained, it is now necessary to apply those 
to the NPT. 
Referring to case law of Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India, it can be 
seen that the Marshall Islands argued that despite both Pakistan and India not being signatory 
states to the Treaty, it regardless applied as it could be considered international customary 
law. As discussed by Pakistan in 1966, any nuclear weapon states which wouldn’t ratify the 
NPT would remain a danger to the non nuclear weapon states. However, if the NPT was to be 
considered as codification of international customary law, or its contents had become 
customary international law, it would bring all states which hadn’t ratified the NPT under its 
provisions. In return, this would firstly create a Treaty with a better chance of enforceability, 
and secondly bring the balance in equality of sacrifice towards a neutral one.  
The sections concerning the NPT being international customary law were identical in the 
Marshall Islands applications against Pakistan and India.
99100
 The Applicant listed several 
well founded reasons for the NPT being CIL. To begin with, the Applicant referred to the 
aforementioned 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ, which specified the correct interpretation of 
Article VI of the Treaty. The words of the Court “Indeed, any realistic search for general and 
complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all 
[emphasis added] States.”101, as well as the preceding text which impressed the importance of 
obligations prescribed by Article VI was interpreted as referring to all states, not only 
signatories to the Treaty, as such signaling the opinion of the Court that the Treaty applied to 
all equally as customary law. Further on, the words of President Bedjaoui were referred to, 
once again expressed in the 1996 advisory opinion, where he expressed his views that the 
Treaty impressed the obligations of Article VI to all states, not only signatories, and as such 
had assumed customary force.
102
 Following that the Marshall Islands invoked the resolutions 
and declarations of the United Nations, UN General Assembly, UN Security Council 
condemning nuclear weapons and stressing the importance of, and adherence to, Article 
VI.
103104
 In the cases of Marshall Islands v. Pakistan and Marshall Islands v. India as well as 
Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, the Court rejected the applications on the grounds of no 
dispute existing, and as such did not proceed to the next stage of ruling on the customary 
international law aspect of the Article VI of the Treaty.  
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The arguments given by the Applicant regarding the existence of a dispute were similar 
enough of the nature, that the Court rulings did not differ in spirit, and as such none of the 
rulings added anything to the others and they can be referred to at the same time for the 
purposes of this section. The opinions of the accused states mirrored each other as well, not 
considering Article VI to be international customary law. 
However, the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion furthermore consisted of numerous additional 
statements which implied that Article VI can be considered CIL, and acknowledgements that 
certain criteria for being considered CIL had been fulfilled. The Court acknowledged that 
NPT concerns “the vast majority of the international community”105, and moreover as 
previously mentioned that the involvement of all states is necessary for nuclear disarmament 
to be achieved. Several UN resolutions pertaining to nuclear disarmament have been adopted 
unanimously, and the necessity of nuclear disarmament has been expressed also outside of the 
UN in various instruments, according to the ICJ.
106
 These facts taken together showcase that 
all states
107
 had agreed on the necessity of nuclear disarmament. For ICJ nuclear disarmament 
“remains without any doubt an objective of vital importance to the whole of the international 
community today”108.  
In spirit, states do agree upon the dangers of nuclear weapons and the future necessity of 
nuclear disarmament, however as the Marshall Islands cases show, taking action to move 
towards nuclear disarmament is a different question. However, if the same question is applied 
to, for example, human rights a different argument can be seen. According to Brian D. Lepard 
human rights are undoubtedly customary international law, and despite the often 
transgressions against human life and inviolability by states, they are taken as a violation of 
human rights, not as an accepted state practice.
109
 Whether this approach can also be taken in 
regards to nuclear disarmament is not clear currently, however, the aforementioned ICJ 
judgements do signal that despite state actions nuclear disarmament remains a paramount 
necessity. 
Having determined the most often used method by the ICJ, analysed the arguments provided 
by the Marshall Islands in their application and keeping in mind the 1996 advisory opinion by 
the ICJ, it seems that Article VI of the NPT could be considered to be customary international 
law. States are consistently in agreement upon the necessity of nuclear disarmament, the 
judgements by ICJ imply the customary nature of Article VI, and while states have acted 
against the principle of nuclear disarmament, it might be possible to approach this issue from 
the same viewpoint as human rights norms are approached. A definite answer has yet to be 
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provided by the ICJ. The Marshall Islands cases would have provided an answer, however 
without a definite answer currently only speculation and theorizing is available. Despite that, 
the arguments for tentatively considering Article VI of NPT to be customary international law 
are strong. 
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3. CHAPTER III THE FLAWED TREATY 
3.1 Select Opinions on the Flawed Nature of the NPT 
The words flawed treaty are not a defined term, but rather a description of the 
effectiveness of a treaty. Non-Proliferation Treaty however is quite often called a flawed 
treaty.
110,111,112
 Flaws are generally considered to be deficiencies in the object, imperfections 
in the planned end-result. In treaties they can take several forms. 
For India the NPT is flawed as it is discriminatory against nuclear weapon states which would 
wish to accede to the Treaty currently, namely India would need to disarmament before 
acceding to the Treaty, as its definition of nuclear weapon states, given in Article IX section 
3. is  
For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 
1967.
113
 
and India acquired nuclear weapons after this date.  
The UN in contrast with India lauds the NPT as “an essential pillar of international peace and 
security”114, which has achieved considerable results. Dr Leonard Weiss, an expert in the non-
proliferation sphere
115
 on the other hand has created a list of 14 flaws in NPT which should be 
fixed
116
, which in turn lacks the flaws discussed in this research paper. 
The following sections of this chapter will consist of elaborations on the previous analysis of 
principle of equality, Article VI and CIL nature of NPT, and attempt to further explain how 
these issues flaw the NPT. As to how these flaws came to be, the possible reasons have at 
times been theorised in the previous sections, however a more concise summary should be 
given of which will be added to each of the respective following sections. 
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3.2 The Unsuccessful Application of the Principle of Equality 
The principle of equality has been called balance of the treaty, inequality between 
signatories and other terms. However, the base definition of these versions remains the same. 
The non nuclear weapon states promise to not receive nor achieve nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapon states promise to not transfer nuclear weapons to non nuclear weapon states 
and negotiate on nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
also includes that peaceful nuclear technology should be available for all and prescribes states 
to facilitate exchange of peaceful nuclear technology research. This balance between 
obligations and promises is what equality of sacrifice refers to. 
Marshall Islands in comparison to the accused parties of Pakistan, India and the United 
Kingdom is not anywhere near to being a regional power, or a major player in the 
international sphere. As explored in the previous sections, they were victims of nuclear testing 
in their current territory, with far reaching consequences. Nor had they any influence on the 
creation of the NPT, being under the trusteeship of the United States. 
During the negotiation process of the NPT, the declarations of the United Kingdom, Pakistan 
and India all referenced the equality of sacrifice. However, their declarations were made with 
the hopes of raising questions to be answered in the further negotiation process, or to offer 
possible solutions for identified issues. Whether the NPT is a treaty with equal balance in 
sacrifices given, or not, can only be truly understood with the benefit of hindsight.  
The applications of the Marshall Islands signify that there are definite issues in the balance of 
the Treaty. The non-proliferation aspect of the Treaty has been fulfilled by its signatories, of 
the states which have acquired nuclear weapons after the coming in force of the NPT none 
have been signatories of the NPT. However, nuclear disarmament negotiations haven’t been 
concluded by the signatories. Regardless of possible mitigating circumstances, the results are 
that nuclear disarmament has not occured. 
Furthermore, some of the doubts raised by Pakistan and India regarding the weak points in the 
NPT have been fulfilled. Pakistan raised the issue of nuclear weapon state sacrifice not being 
fulfilled, that is, that non-proliferation would be adhered to, but nuclear disarmament 
wouldn’t. This has become the truth, and the best example of why the NPT has not been 
successful in the application of the principle of equality of sacrifice.  
India however brought up the point that a complete nuclear disarmament would be the only 
successful nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons are capable of destroying the world, and 
despite only one fifth of them remaining from the times of the Cold War
117
, the remaining 
ones are still capable of destroying the world. Pakistan also had brought up the possibility of 
newly emerged nuclear weapon states not acceding to the NPT, which once again has come 
true. However, given that acceding to the NPT for newly emerged nuclear weapon states is a 
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laborious effort, this is the occasion where mitigating circumstances can be taken into 
account.  
The Non-Proliferation Treaty could have become unbalanced in several ways, and of those 
quite a few have occured. The worries that nuclear disarmament wouldn’t take place, or 
wouldn’t be completed, that new nuclear weapon states would emerge and not accede to the 
Treaty have been fulfilled. And furthermore, the Marshall Islands applications and their 
subsequent dismissal shows both this issue in the balance of sacrifice as well as the 
unwillingness of the ICJ to admit to the inequality. 
As for why this inequality of sacrifice was allowed to happen, the answer is very 
multifaceted. Firstly, at the time of the creation of the NPT the priority of all states was to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to stop the arms race between the US and the USSR. 
The other issues, such as nuclear disarmament were not as high of a priority at the time, since 
the possible destruction of the world took precedence. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a 
study in compromise, as while non nuclear weapon states demanded their voices to be heard, 
the Treaty couldn’t exist without nuclear weapon states and they were the ones which in the 
end held more power. The subsequent events which allowed for the nuclear weapon states to 
comparatively ignore their obligation to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons were 
numerous. However, this research paper is primarily concerned with the existence of flaws in 
the NPT, not the diplomatic, military and political history of nuclear weapon states. 
3.3 No Unanimous Interpretation of Article VI  
Article VI might have attempted to urge nuclear weapon states towards compliance 
with the obligation to negotiate on nuclear disarmament with the addition of the good faith 
clause, however evidently it has not been successful. The evidence Marshall Islands provided 
in their applications show that nuclear disarmament has not taken place, nor have the nuclear 
weapon states sought to partake in negotiations towards it.  
While it is possible that a strictly worded nuclear disarmament obligation would have been 
adhered to by the nuclear weapon states, the reality is that until the oft referred to advisory 
opinion of the ICJ, which included a specification on the meaning of Article VI, the 
obligations prescribed by it were interpretable. Room for interpretation in treaties provides 
opportunities for states to interpret them in their own favor and not in accordance with how 
they were meant to be interpreted.  
In the case of Article VI, the obligation to pursue negotiations could just as well be taken the 
obligation to, in opportunities where negotiation was possible to participate in good faith. 
This interpretation does not include the nuclear weapon states initiating negotiations, nor the 
necessity for them to conclude the negotiations with a favourable resolution of nuclear 
disarmament. 
The fact itself that ICJ saw the necessity to define the obligations of Article VI signified that 
the article was ambiguously enough worded that obligations were unclear. Between the 
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coming in force of the Treaty in 1970 and the advisory opinion which specified the 
obligations of Article VI in 1996 a quarter of a century had passed. During this time, the 
obligation to conclude nuclear disarmament negotiations was firstly not agreed upon, and 
secondly it was unenforceable.  
A treaty whose obligations aren’t clear to those which they apply to and whose obligations 
subsequently aren’t enforceable is a treaty with a critical flaw. Although this section 
specifically concerns itself with Article VI, only one section of the Treaty, Article VI 
encompassed some of the main goals which the NPT was attempting to achieve.  
As to how this issue came to be, the reasons are mainly the same as those mentioned in the 
previous section. With the nuclear weapon states holding the main negotiating power (nuclear 
weapons), the Treaty had to be one they would all accept. Furthermore, the priority at the time 
was non-proliferation, not nuclear disarmament. As such, the wording of Article VI ended 
leaning in the favor of nuclear weapon states, being ambiguously interpretable regarding 
nuclear disarmament. 
 
3.4 Non-Enforceable Treaty 
While the previous section discussed the issues with the enforceability of Article VI 
due to its unclarity, the enforceability of the Treaty as a whole remains discussable. The fears 
of Pakistan in 1966 came true and currently there are nuclear weapon states which aren’t 
bound to the terms of the NPT. Subsequently, unless these states willingly choose to obey the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the obligations and responsibilities of it aren’t enforceable. 
Furthermore, currently the Treaty doesn’t provide for nuclear weapon states which achieved 
nuclear weaponry after 1970, so even in a case if these non signatory states would want to 
accede it would require heavy concessions from the nuclear weapon states or amendments to 
the NPT.  
However, as discussed previously the possibility remains that NPT Article VI could come to 
be considered customary international law. If it were so, then those nuclear states which have 
not acceded to the Treaty would become liable for their actions. However, the Marshall 
Islands cases were dismissed by the International Court of Justice before the matter of the 
customary international law nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be judged.  
Regarding the dismissal of the case by the ICJ, there is some controversy regarding their 
decision to judge the issue as no grounds.
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 However, perhaps more concerning is the fact 
that that ICJ judgements are final and without the possibility of appeal
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, which means that 
the Marshall Islands applications cannot be brought back to the ICJ. Without new evidence a 
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revision of the case seems unlikely, and a decision to revise the judgement remains in the 
arms of the ICJ, according to their Rules of Court. Currently for a new case to be judged in 
the ICJ regarding NPT Article VI it seems that the defendant needs to be officially made 
aware that the applicant considers their noncompliance an issue, and it is still unknown 
whether customary international law argument would be accepted, although as the previous 
sections show it is likely.  
In conclusion, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is hard to enforce. The advisory opinion of 1996 
by the ICJ might have deemed that NPT prescribes signatories to conclude nuclear 
disarmament negotiations, but the enforceability of this obligation is a different matter. From 
Marshall Islands applications against nuclear weapon states which have ratified the NPT only 
the application against the United Kingdom was under the jurisdiction of the ICJ. From the 
nuclear weapon states which haven’t ratified the NPT, only the applications against Pakistan 
and India were admissible. And it is unknown if the cases had progressed further than the 
discovery of there being no dispute between the parties, that is whether the customary 
international law aspect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would have been recognised and the 
application against Pakistan and India would have progressed further. Subsequently, in ICJ 
the only surety is that the United Kingdom (meaning one from nine nuclear weapon states)  
can be judged on non adherence to the NPT.  
As to how the unenforceability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty came to be, a key issue is the 
fact the treaties are difficult to enforce. With no overarching supranational court states have to 
be willing to go to court. No single cause for how this reality of law came to be can be 
pinpointed, but regardless an unenforceable treaty remains a flawed treaty.  
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CONCLUSION 
This research paper has used the vessel of the Marshall Islands cases to explore three 
specific flaws inherent in the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. While the Marshall Islands 
submitted nine applications to the ICJ, one against each of the nuclear weapon states, only 
three weren’t dismissed outright. These three cases Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, 
Marshall Islands v. Pakistan and Marshall Islands v. India, have been used as a basis in 
which the possible flaws of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were located.  
The inequality between the signatories of NPT, more specifically between the non nuclear 
weapon states and nuclear weapon states was best seen in the Marshall Islands v. United 
Kingdom case. Later the term for inequality between the states was specified to “equality of 
sacrifice”, borrowed from the 1966 declaration by the United Kingdom. However the fact 
remains that 44 years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force a non nuclear weapon 
state was forced to bring a case to the International Court of Justice against a nuclear weapon 
state. The inequality was immediately noticeable, as the non-proliferation obligation can be 
seen fulfilled just as well as the nuclear disarmament obligation can be seen unfulfilled.  
This principle of equality of sacrifice was explored by analysing the declarations made by the 
United Kingdom, Pakistan and India in the 1966 General Assembly. Further research would 
be necessary to achieve the full picture, however these three declarations alone were already 
dissenting. This is proof of the first flaw in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that of states not 
being in agreement whether the Treaty was fair, or “equal in sacrifices”, or not. The 
advantage of hindsight affords us the opportunity to conclude that the principle of equality of 
sacrifice was not upheld, as the nuclear weapon states have made little progress towards 
nuclear disarmament.  
Division in views of what the Treaty should consist of left its marks on its contents. All of the 
Marshall Islands cases accused the defendants of breaching Article VI of the NPT, and all of 
them as well referred to the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons. In this advisory opinion Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
necessitated the International Court of Justice to provide the correct interpretation in the 
advisory opinion, as the ambiguous wording left too much room for interpretation. These 26 
years between the NPT coming in force and ICJ clarifying Article VI could have been spent 
more productively, if the negotiating states were able to agree on stricter wording. However, 
it is possible that even if Article VI were to be clearly and unmistakably worded, the 
enforceability of the article would still remain an issue.  
From the nine cases that Marshall Islands submitted, three weren’t dismissed outright. Of 
those, two relied on the assumption that the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be considered 
customary international law since the defendants weren’t signatories. All three cases, 
Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom, Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, Marshall Islands v. India, 
were dismissed on the grounds of no dispute between the parties, before the International 
Court of Justice came to a stage where the customary international law nature of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty could be discussed. The enforceability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
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perhaps the worst flaw of it. The nine cases which the Marshall Islands submitted were clear 
proof of it. And while the analysis done in this research paper shows that it is likely that the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty could be considered customary international law by the International 
Court of Justice, it still leaves the question of how compliance could be enforced for the six 
nuclear weapons states against whom the applications were dismissed outright due to ICJ not 
having the jurisdiction to judge.  
These flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty are not fatal ones. While the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty has been shown to be unfair, imbalanced, vague and unenforceable, it still has 
achieved much in the sphere of non-proliferation. In conclusion, the research question of “to 
what extent has the ambiguous wording of Article VI, jurisdictive unclarity and inequality 
between the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as shown by the Marshall Islands 
cases resulted in a flawed Treaty?” has been extensively answered by this research paper. The 
three flaws of NPT- the ambiguous wording of Article VI, jurisdictive unclarity and 
inequality between the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have directly worsened the 
enforceability of the NPT, have created long stretches of time where the obligations of the 
NPT have been unclear, and have created an unequal, flawed treaty. These flaws have 
extensively influenced the Treaty and flawed it. The hypothesis put forth by the author that 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty is flawed, especially in regards to Article VI, jurisdictive 
unclarity and inequality between the signatories of the Treaty, has been proven to be true. As 
previously stated, these three issues have directly flawed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
This research paper has explored three specific issues in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
however further research should be conducted on other flaws in the very build of the Treaty. 
Several other flaws have been mentioned in the analysis, such as the obstacles for states 
which would want to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the problems in amending 
the Treaty. Furthermore, the question of customary international law nature of treaties and 
how it can be ascertained deserve a separate discussion which is able to go further in detail.  
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